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ABSTRACT
News media differentially cover violence based on social identity. How does media bias
apply to terrorist attacks—typically “upward crimes” where perpetrators hold less power
than targets—that are also hate crimes—typically “downward crimes”? We compare
coverage of incidents that are both terrorist attacks and hate crimes to coverage of
incidents that are just terrorism in the U.S. from 2006 to 2015. Attacks that are also hate
crimes receive less media attention. Articles are more likely to reference hate
crimes when the perpetrator is unknown and more likely to reference terrorism when the
perpetrator is non-white in some models.
In the last few decades in the United States, federal, state, and local
governments, 1 scholars, 2 and the public 3 have paid a great deal of attention to
terrorism and terrorism prevention. At the same time, relatively little attention has been
paid to hate crimes—which data show are far more prevalent in the United
States. 4 Both terrorism and hate crimes are real problems in society, but they appear to
evoke different responses from both the government and the public.
In part, greater attention to terrorism relative to hate crimes may be a function of the
typical perpetrator-offender dynamic in each. Scholars have examined similarities and
differences between terrorism—defined by the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) 5 as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor
to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation—and hate crimes—defined by the U.S. Hate Crime Statistics Act (1990,
amended 2009) 6 as a criminal offense committed against a person or property that is
motivated in whole, or in part, by bias or prejudice against race, national or ethnic origin,
religion, sexual orientation, or disability. This work has debated whether terrorism and
hate crimes are “close cousins” or “distant relatives.” 7 As Deloughery and colleagues
note, terrorist attacks are typically “upward crimes” where perpetrators have less power
than targets whereas hate crimes are typically “downward crimes” where the reverse is

true. 8 Yet, Mills and colleagues argue that terrorism and hate crimes have a number of
similarities. Indeed, a number of terrorist attacks—though certainly not all—are also
hate crimes. 9 A separate body of work focuses on bias in news media coverage of
crimes generally 10 and terrorism specifically. 11 We draw from these two bodies of
scholarship to address the following research question: How—if at all—do media
differentially cover terrorist attacks that are also hate crimes compared to those that are
not?
This paper is organized as follows: First we review the literature on newsworthiness
and media bias in general and discuss how this applies to terrorism and crime
specifically. We then summarize extant literature on public perceptions of terrorism and
hate crimes and outline the aims of our study. Next, we describe our methodological
and analytical approach and present our results. We conclude with a discussion of our
findings, their implications, and suggestions for future research directions.

Background
Newsworthiness and Media Bias
News media serve two primary roles: (1) determining what gets shared with the public
and (2) establishing how that information is presented. 12 Thus, news media play a vital
role in how we view the world. Yet, news media are not impartial; page space and
location have value, so stories selected for coverage must be interesting and relevant,
or “newsworthy.” In determining what is “newsworthy,” Harcup and O’Neill 13 found that
potential stories must generally satisfy one (and preferably more) of the following
requirements: exclusivity, bad news, conflict, surprise, audio-visual, shareability,
entertainment, drama, follow-up, the power elite, relevance, magnitude, celebrity, good
news, and news organization agenda.
Beyond news selection, news treatment takes into account the intentions of
journalists 14 and can never truly be objective. 15 News media coverage often reflect and
reinforce dominant ideologies, values, and power structures in a society. 16 By
reinforcing dominant narratives over time, these perspectives become “common
sense.” 17 Hall suggested that news values themselves are part of an ideologically
constructed way of perceiving the world that favors and “naturalizes” the perspectives of
powerful elites. 18 This argument is the basis for Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda
model 19 in their work “Manufacturing Consent,” Herman and Chomsky delineate five
filters (ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and anti-Communism/fear) that news must
survive before being published and argue that the propaganda model views corporate
media as businesses interested in the sale of a product—readers and audiences—to
other businesses (advertisers) rather than the pursuit of quality journalism in service of
the public. 20 Thus, what becomes “news” is the result of a system that prioritizes

newsworthiness without upsetting the status quo. Westerhahl and Johansson explain
that the journalistic selection process is “probably as important or perhaps more
important than what ‘really happens’” when determining what is newsworthy. 21 Because
of this, news values can be seen less as a reflection of what type of information citizens
want or need, and more as a reflection of organizational, sociological, and cultural
norms combined with economic factors. 22
Newsworthiness and Media Bias in Coverage of Crime and Terrorism
The adage “if it bleeds, it leads” refers to news media’s tendency to provide coverage to
gruesome or violent incidents that is disproportionate to their actual frequency. Of the
newsworthiness elements that Harcup and O’Neill identified, two—bad
news and surprise—are most relevant to terrorism and hate crimes, while elements
of conflict, audio-visual, relevance, magnitude, and news organization agenda may also
be present. 23 Looking first at crime generally, violent offenses like homicide receive
dramatically more news media attention than the actual prevalence of these
offenses, 24 which may help explain moral panics over crime despite the decreasing
crime rate in the United States. 25 Drawing from social identity theory and media’s
tendency to reinforce narratives of dominant groups in society—news media also tend
to cover crime in ways that suggest minorities are more likely to be perpetrators than is
truly the case. 26 While it is incredibly challenging to measure the aggregate influence of
media on public views, there is reason to believe that news media coverage can
influence perceptions of crime and justice issues. 27
Turning to media coverage of terrorism, there is ample evidence that news media
depict this violence in biased ways. Muslim-perpetrated terrorist attacks receive
significantly more coverage than attacks perpetrated by non-Muslim actors. 28 Further,
other factors like target type and fatalities influence the amount of coverage that terrorist
attacks receive. 29 Additionally, terrorist attacks receive less coverage when they are
framed instead as crimes than when they are not. 30 Similarly, kidnappings framed as
terrorism receive more coverage than kidnappings without this framing. 31 Looking then
at the content of news, coverage of Muslim-perpetrated attacks is more likely to
reference terrorism than coverage of attacks with non-Muslim perpetrators. 32 In
contrast, some studies 33 find that coverage of non-Muslim perpetrators is more likely to
reference mental illness though this connection is not found in the only systematic
review of cases. 34 Relatedly, Gade and colleagues examined news coverage of mass
shooters in the U.S. and found that coverage of white perpetrators was more
sympathetic and positive. 35 In short, research clearly shows media bias in coverage of
both crime and terrorism. What we do not yet know, however, is whether media
differentially cover terrorist attacks that are also hate crimes compared to attacks that

are not. Beyond the potential for identity-based bias in media coverage, the mere
existence of fatalities in an attack may influence how the attack is covered. Terror
Management Theory posits that humans avoid thoughts of death and the conflict that
arises between one’s self-preservation instinct and the reality that death is
inevitable. 36 Yet, some violent events involve death and thus may prime mortality
salience which could influence how journalists report on those events. Attacks with
higher fatalities might simultaneously be seen as more newsworthy and be more likely
to break the psychological comforts used to cope with death anxiety.
Social Identity, Crime Direction, and Relational Distance
Social identity theory describes the existence of and the process for creating in- and
out-groups based on perceived similarities or dissimilarities to others. 37 Through this
process of self-categorization, people form identities that link them to certain social
categories or groups (in-groups) while distancing them from others (out-groups). 38 As a
result of this self-categorization, people tend to accentuate their perceived similarities to
other in-group members and their perceived differences from out-group members in
ways that are self-enhancing. Abrams and Hogg delineate common social categorical
splits (rich/poor, white/Black, etc.) and describe the traits with which in- and out-groups
are compared (power, prestige, status, etc.). 39 Group membership may be formed
around—and shaped by—cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral lines. Social
stereotyping, a cognitive outcome, magnifies perceived differences between groups and
homogeneity within groups.
Though social identity is individual and maintained internally, media’s role reinforcing
dominant viewpoints can bolster public perceptions of group-based differences through
bias in reporting. Gans categorized four types of “disorder stories” (natural,
technological, social, and moral), two of which are relevant to the discussion at hand on
media coverage of terrorism and hate crimes (social and moral). 40 For example,
Husselbee and Elliott analyzed news media coverage of the murders of James Byrd Jr.
in Jasper, Texas and Matthew Shepard in Laramie, Wyoming. 41 They found that
coverage highlighted community differences (i.e. racial tension and homophobia), but
that coverage was more frequently positive (e.g. “the community is healing”) rather than
negative (e.g. “rednecks who come from broken homes filled with hatred”). Regardless
of the tenor, how media framed these incidents highlighted and reinforced in- and outgroups.
Other than the Gans and the Husselbee and Elliott studies, there remains a dearth of
research on hate crimes and media. 42 Instead, we look to Donald Black’s behavior of
law (BOL) to supplement the expectations we draw from social identity theory. 43 We are
less interested in Black’s overall argument, that “law is a quantitative variable… the

quantity of law varies in time and space,” rather we are interested in the dimensions he
uses as predictors in his model. 44 The vertical dimension, which corresponds to
socioeconomic status (SES) or social class, and the horizontal dimension, which
corresponds to race, ethnicity, and native-born versus foreign-born status. Whereas
social identity theory describes the processes in which societies create in- and outgroups, and how individuals may self-categorize, Black explains a directional
relationship for both crime and law, plus a relational distance between individuals and
the law.
Black argues that the directional relationship between a victim and offender will
determine the perceived severity of the offense and the level of retribution that will result
from the law. 45 For example, terrorism is typically an “upward crime” where a lowerpower perpetrator attacks a higher-power target. In this case, the public should view
such an attack as more severe and the punitive response to it should be stronger.
Conversely, hate crimes are typically “downward crime” where a higher-power
perpetrator attacks a lower-power victim. The public should view this as less severe
than terrorism and, likewise, the punitive response to it should be weaker. Though Black
limits his discussion to the society, generally, and the law, specifically, we do not believe
it is a stretch to include the media as the mechanism which most strongly affects public
perception.
Similar to the directional relationship of the vertical dimension, Black also provides a
way to view the relational distance on the horizontal dimension. 46 On this horizontal
dimension, individuals are located at different positions of radial status: “The radial
location of a person or group is a status that confers privileges and disabilities.” 47 If
individuals have a higher radial status, they are more integrated into mainstream society
and are closer to the “center.” Individuals have a lower radial status when they are less
integrated into mainstream society and are closer to the “margin.” This idea of being at
the center or the margin is independent of SES or rank 48 : “A useful person may be
wealthy, but not necessarily, and the same applies to the marginal: some are central to
social life, even essential, and yet low in rank; others are wealthy and do nothing.”
Employment, marriage, and resident statuses are examples of factors that determine
radial location. The public perception of severity and governmental legal response
follow a similar pattern: “outward” crimes of the native against foreign-born are seen as
less severe than “inward” crimes of the foreign against native-born and are punished
less punitively.
The Present Study
Research clearly shows that news media coverage of crime generally and terrorism
specifically is often biased both in which attacks are deemed more newsworthy and in

how the newsworthy attacks are portrayed. Drawing from social identity theory, these
biases in coverage often reflect dominant perspectives in society about threats and
sources of those threats. 49 Yet, sometimes an attack is both terrorism (an upward crime
typically perpetrated against a more powerful target) and a hate crime (a downward
crime typically perpetrated against a less powerful target). Our interest here is in
understanding how—if at all—media differentially cover terrorist attacks that are also
hate crimes compared to those that are not. While we do not specify hypotheses for
what factors make an attack more newsworthy, we first explore whether or not
differences exist in the amount of coverage given to attacks that are both terrorism and
a hate crime versus those that are just terrorism before testing hypotheses about how
incidents are portrayed of media coverage.
Drawing from social identity theory and media’s role to further dominant
narratives, 50 news coverage in the United States—where the majority of the population
is white and Christian—should depict members of these in-groups more favorably than
members of out-groups. Minorities are often portrayed as criminals 51 and Muslims are
often portrayed as terrorists 52 in both entertainment and news media. In contrast,
threats from domestic in-groups are often downplayed. 53 From this, we expect that both
the perpetrator’s race and whether or not the terrorist attack is also a hate crime should
influence how media depiction attacks. Specifically:
H1: Articles will be more likely to reference terrorism only when the perpetrator is
non-white
H2: Articles will be more likely to reference hate crimes only when the perpetrator
is white
Some incidents meet the definition of both terrorism and a hate crime. Since hate
crimes are typically “downward crimes” perpetrated by more powerful actors, when
these attacks also meet the definition of terrorism media may be more inclined to
downplay the terrorism aspect which has a more negative connotation, by either
neglecting to mention it or also mentioning hate crimes. Specifically, when a terrorist
attack is also a hate crime:
H3: Articles will be less likely to reference terrorism only
H4: Articles will be more likely to reference hate crimes only
H5: Articles will be more likely to reference both terrorism and hate crimes
Drawing from Terror Management Theory, higher-fatality incidents can induce a
greater sense of one’s own mortality and may influence how journalists cover the
attack. 54 Attacks with a higher number of fatalities receive more media
coverage. 55 Additionally, members of the public are more likely to perceive an incident
as terrorism when the fatalities rise. 56 Further, returning to social identity theory as well,

not just how many people are killed but also who is killed should influence how media
depict violence. From this, we expect:
H6: Articles will be less likely to reference terrorism only as the number of people
killed increases and the incident is also a hate crime
H7: Articles will be more likely to reference terrorism and hate crimes when the
number of people killed increases and the incident is also a hate crime
Beyond perpetrator identity and the number of fatalities, prior research on media
coverage of terrorism shows that other factors can influence newsworthiness and media
bias. For example, attacks receive more coverage when the perpetrator was arrested
and when the target was law enforcement or government. 57 When the perpetrator was
connected to a known group that uses terrorism, news coverage was more likely to
mention terrorism. 58 We control for these factors in our analyses. Further, sometimes
there is doubt about whether or not an attack clearly meets all of the definitional criteria
for terrorism. When there is some doubt among experts about how to classify the attack,
there may also be more debate among media on how to depict it. To account for this
potential, we estimate models with all cases in the GTD and with only those for which
there is no doubt that they are terrorism. Importantly, there is no analogous body of
work on newsworthiness and media bias in coverage of hate crimes on which to draw
additional control variables.

Method
Data
For this project we examine print media coverage of terrorist attacks—those that are
also hate crimes and those that are not—in the United States between 2006 and 2015.
We first identified attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which lists 170 total
attacks though some had the same perpetrator(s) and were thus reported on together in
media coverage. We collapse such attacks with the same perpetrator(s) into a single
event to avoid over-counting or duplicating articles. In sum, there are 136 terrorism
episodes in the U.S. during this ten-year span.
In an ideal world, we would also examine and compare media coverage of incidents
that are hate crimes only and not terrorism. Unfortunately, the nature of hate crime data
do not allow us to systematically identify cases in a way that would make for sound
comparison. Data on reported hate crimes come from the FBI’s Unified Crime Report,
which are incomplete in ways that are likely biased. Barnett-Ryan and Nolan have
measured the effects of UCR policy on successful hate crime data submission by law
enforcement. 59 Though many police departments have improved over time, there
remain barriers between the crime act and the production of an official record of that
act. First, hate crime enhancements are difficult to prove in court. As a result, many

police officers (and district attorneys) figure it is “better” to submit an attack as “murder”
and get a conviction than to record it as “hate crime murder” and risk a non-conviction
on the more difficult-to-prove offense. Second, the data that do exist may be skewed by
the local departmental and societal views. For example, according to the UCR,
California is home to a disproportionate amount of bias crime each year. Part of this is
due to California’s higher-than-average minority population as victims need to be
present physically to be targeted, but this also may be partially due to the likelihood that
victims feel more comfortable reporting their crimes to Californian police than in states
with a worse history of institutional racism, including among law enforcement. Due to
these barriers, the crimes most likely to be accurate within the UCR are the ones
involving the most blatant displays of bigotry before, during, or after the criminal act.
Thus, the FBI’s Unified Crime Report hate crimes data are not representative of all hate
crimes that actually occur in the U.S. and are likely biased in meaningful ways. In
comparison, GTD data on terrorism are collected in a systematic and unbiased way. For
this reason, any comparison between the universe of terrorism cases (some of which
are also hate crimes) and a biased sample of hate crime cases is not methodologically
sound. Further, the UCR data include each incident’s date and location but no
identifying information, which makes searching for media coverage of these incidents
difficult if not impossible.
After identifying cases, we then collected media coverage of these attacks from
LexisNexis Academic and CNN.com. LexisNexis Academic houses the full text of print
articles from news outlets around the U.S. and is commonly used in academic research
on news coverage. 60 LexisNexis Academic pulls coverage from both major news
sources like The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post and local news sources
from Bangor, ME to San Gabriel, CA, from Tampa, FL to Seattle, WA, and from well
over 100 other newspapers in between. We then searched CNN.com’s archives to
supplement the hard copy print coverage with online coverage. While our original aim
was to compare coverage across political ideologies, neither Fox News nor Huffington
Post have public archives dating back to 2006. Further, the number of sources that
LexisNexis pulls from precludes comparison across or controlling for specific sources.
Procedure
To identify articles covering each attack, we searched LexisNexis Academic and
CNN.com for U.S.-based coverage from the date of each attack through the end of
2016. For each attack, we searched for the perpetrator(s) if known, the location, and
other key words about the attack. To ensure that we did not miss articles, our first aim
was to be overly inclusive of potential articles covering each attack. Following this, each
potential article was separately reviewed by two researchers to determine whether or

not its primary focus was on the attack, perpetrator(s), or victim(s). Articles that did not
meet this criterion were removed—most typically excluded articles were lists of attacks,
memorials held at other locations, or articles that used the attack as an anecdote to
argue for a policy position. In total, our final dataset contains 3,541 news articles
covering 136 terrorism episodes. Of note, however, is that 36 of these attacks did not
receive any media coverage from our sources and thus are excluded from analyses of
the content of media coverage—but not analyses of the quantity of coverage. Online
Appendix A contains the list of terrorist attacks in our dataset and the number of articles
on each.
Variables
We are interested in two outcome variables related to newsworthiness and media bias.
First, we are interested whether or not there are differences in the amount of
coverage between attacks that are both terrorism and hate crimes and those that are
just terrorism. To examine this, we use a simple count of the number of articles that
each attack receives in the sources that we reviewed, which serves as our first outcome
variable. Second, we are interested in how attacks are discussed in coverage.
Specifically, we are interested in whether an article references: (1) terrorism only,
(2) hate crimes only, (3) terrorism and hate crimes, or (4)
neither terrorism nor hate crimes.
Once we identified the 3,541 news articles, two researchers separately searched the
entire dataset in Nvivo to determine whether keywords associated with
both terrorism 61 and hate crimes appeared in each article (see Online Appendix B for
keywords). There was no subjectivity in this process as keywords either appear or they
do not in each article. Coding discrepancies resulted from Nvivo either not recognizing
punctuation marks or coding comments sections or URLs. After the preliminary coding,
Krippendorff’s alpha was above the common threshold of 0.8 for both mentions
of terrorism (α = 0.88) and hate crimes (α = 0.97) across all articles. 62 To increase
confidence in our coding, all discrepancies were reviewed and discussed until a final
determination was made for each variable across these articles. To create our second
outcome variable, we use the binary indicators for mentions terrorism and mentions
hate crimes to create a variable for depictions where an article can reference:
(1) terrorism only; (2) hate crimes only; (3) both terrorism and hate crimes; or, (4)
neither terrorism nor hate crimes.
Our key predictor variables focus on the number of people killed, the perpetrator’s
race, and whether or not the incident is also a hate crime. Fatalities are measured from
the GTD as a count of the number—excluding perpetrator(s)—killed in the attack. Since
the GTD does not code perpetrator race or whether or not the attack is also a hate

crime, two researchers separately coded these variables prior to examining any of the
news coverage. Perpetrator race was coded categorically: perpetrator white, perpetrator
non-white, or perpetrator unknown. Krippendorff’s alpha for preliminary coding of
perpetrator race (α = 0.91) was above the common threshold of 0.8. 63 For additional
confidence in our coding, we discussed coding discrepancies and agreed on final
codes. We then created three mutually exclusive binary variables from the categorical
coding for perpetrator race.
To identify which of the 136 terrorism episodes were also hate crimes, we turned first
to the FBI’s Unified Crime Report data on reported hate crimes. We cross-referenced
dates, locations, and targets and code hate crime as 1 if the incident was listed in the
UCR Hate Crimes data. As discussed in detail above, these data are unfortunately
incomplete. To supplement UCR’s coding limitations, both authors separately reviewed
each of the incident summaries from the GTD and coded incidents as hate crimes if
they meet the U.S. Hate Crime Statistics Act definition for it, even if UCR data do not
include the case or if the case was not officially charged as a hate crime. Krippendorff’s
alpha for preliminary coding of hate crime (α = 0.99) was above the common threshold
of 0.8. 64 We then discussed the single disagreement to a determine final code. Of these
136 terrorism episodes, 49 (36.0%) are also hate crimes.
Using prior research as a guide, we control for three factors found to influence media
coverage of terrorism: whether the perpetrator was arrested; whether the target was law
enforcement or government; and whether the perpetrator was connected to a known
group that uses terrorism. We used GTD codes to identify target type and group
affiliation. Since the GTD does not code whether or not at least one of the perpetrators
was arrested, two researchers coded this variable and there was no disagreement in
preliminary coding. Further, the GTD includes a binary variable indicating whether or not
there is any doubt that an attack meets all definitional criterial for terrorism. As a
robustness check, we estimate our models to include only attacks where there is no
doubt about considering it terrorism. See Table 1 for each variable’s descriptive
statistics across both incidents and across articles about those incidents. 65

Results
We are interested in how—if at all—media differentially cover terrorist attacks that
are also hate crimes compared to those that are not. To examine this, we first look at
the amount of coverage that attacks receive and we then examine differences in how
articles discuss attacks. Since our first outcome variable is a count of the number of
articles that each attack received, models are estimated with negative binomial
regression and bootstrapped standard errors given the small number of observations.
We did not specify hypotheses for what factors make an attack more newsworthy,

rather we are interested in whether or not differences exist in the amount of coverage
given to attacks that are terrorism and a hate crime versus those that are just
terrorism. Table 2 presents these findings where Models 1 and 2 use the full list of
attacks in the U.S. from 2006 to 2015 with control variables presented in Model 2.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. (Table view)
Variable
Dependent variables
Number of articles per incident
Article mentions terrorism only
Article mentions hate crimes only
Article mentions terrorism and hate crimes
Article neither mentions terrorism nor hate
crimes
Independent variables by incident (N = 136)
Perpetrator non-white
Perpetrator white
Perpetrator unknown
Incident also a hate crime
Number killed
Perpetrator part of group that uses terrorism
Perpetrator arrested
Target law enforcement/government
Does not meet all criteria for terrorism
Independent variables by article (N = 3,541)
Perpetrator non-white
Perpetrator white
Perpetrator unknown
Incident also a hate crime
Number killed
Perpetrator part of group that uses terrorism
Perpetrator arrested
Target law enforcement/government
Does not meet all criteria for terrorism

Frequency
–

Mean
(SD)

Median Range
3.5

0–460

36.7%
7.6%
2.3%
53.4%

26.0
(62.3)
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–

20.3%
38.4%
41.4%
36.0%
–
16.2%
47.1%
20.6%
16.9%

–
–
–
–
0.7 (2.4)
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–
0
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–
0–15
–
–
–
–

59.6%
35.5%
4.9%
19.2%
–
11.6%
73.7%
38.5%
13.8%

–
–
–
–
4.00 (4.8)
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–
3
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–
0–15
–
–
–
–

Models 3 and 4 replicate the earlier models with only cases where there is no doubt that
the attack is terrorism. In the full sample, terrorist attacks that are also hate crimes have
46–48% fewer news articles on average covering them than attacks that are not.
However, there is no significant difference in the amount of coverage when the sample
is limited to only cases where there is no doubt that it is terrorism. Across models, both
white and non-white perpetrated attacks receive significantly more media coverage than
attacks with an unknown perpetrator though the percent increase varies substantially
between the two as well as across models. 66 Across models each additional fatality is
linked to a 34–37% increase in the number of articles covering that attack. Somewhat
surprisingly given their significance in prior research, none of the control variables—
whether the perpetrator was part of a known groups, whether the perpetrator was
arrested, and whether the target was law enforcement or government—were related to
the amount of coverage that each attack received in these analyses.
Turning now to how media depict attacks, we test our hypotheses about factors that
influence whether an article references terrorism only, hate crimes only, both terrorism
and hate crimes, or neither terrorism nor hate crimes. Since the outcome variable here
takes one of four mutually exclusive values, we estimate models with multinomial
logistic regression where neither mentioning terrorism nor hate crimes is the reference
category and standard errors are clustered on the incident as show in Table 3. To ease
interpretability, we present relative risk ratios instead of coefficients. Relative risk ratios
are interpreted similarly to odds ratios for logistic regression where a ratio greater than
one indicates a positive relationship and a ratio less than one indicates a negative
relationship. As a robustness check, we replicate the models in Table 3 but only include
cases where there is no doubt that each is terrorism and present those results in Table
4.
Our first two hypotheses focus on how perpetrator identity influences how media
depict attacks. Hypothesis 1 expects that articles will be more likely to
reference terrorism only when the perpetrator is non-white, which is partially supported.
In the full model (Model 6), the odds that an article mentions terrorism only is about four
times greater for coverage of non-white perpetrators relative to unknown perpetrators.
However, this finding is not supported in the constrained model (Model 5) nor is it
supported when only including cases where there is no doubt that they are terrorism
(Models 11 and 12). Hypothesis 2 expects that articles will be more likely to
reference hate crimes only when the perpetrator is white. This was not supported and,
in the full model (Model 8), the opposite relationship was found. Relative to where
coverage of an attack with an unknown perpetrator, the odds that an article mentions
hate crimes only is 88% lower when the perpetrator is white and 87% lower when the
perpetrator is non-white. When considering only coverage of attacks where there is no
doubt that they are terrorism, these finding hold (Model 14). An important note here is

that the perpetrators responsible for many attacks against mosques, Black churches,
and synagogues—all of which are hate crimes—were never found, which likely
influences this finding.
Table 2. Number of articles by terrorism episode. (Table view)
All episodes
(N = 136)
Model 1

Episodes where no doubt it is
terrorism (N = 113)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

2.79*** 2.45***
(0.35)
(0.44)
[1533%] [1058%]
Perpetrator white
2.01***
1.54**
(0.36)
(0.46)
[643%] [364%]
Incident is also a
–0.65*
–0.62*
hatecrime
(0.27)
(0.30)
[–48%] [–46%]
Number killed
0.29**
0.29**
(0.09)
(0.09)
[34%]
[34%]
Perpetrator part of
–0.19
known group
(0.42)
[–18%]
Perpetrator arrested
0.62†
(0.34)
[86%]
Target law
0.20
enforcement/government
(0.36)
[22%]
AIC
901.33
903.42

2.71***
(0.44)
[1408%]
1.90***
(0.38)
[565%]
–0.59†
(0.32)
[–45%]
0.32**
(0.11)
[37%]

746.44

2.38***
(0.49)
[980%]
1.44**
(0.44)
[324%]
–0.59†
(0.34)
[–45%]
0.31**
(0.11)
[37%]
–0.23
(0.42)
[–21%]
0.63†
(0.37)
[88%]
0.10
(0.42)
[10%]
749.02

762.81

773.56

Perpetrator non-white

BIC

918.81

929.63

Negative binomial regression models. Constants not reported.
Coefficients are presented with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses and bolded if significant.
Percent change in expected count reported in brackets.
†
p < 0.10.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

Table 3. Depicting attacks by article (N = 3,541). (Table view)
Terrorism &
hate crime
Model Model
Model 6
Model 7 Model 8
9
10
5.12*
0.58
0.12**
2.09
2.62
(4.25)
(0.45)
(0.09)
(1.25) (3.74)
1.53
0.65
0.13**
2.26
4.24
(1.32)
(0.52)
(0.09)
(2.69) (6.20)
0.19**
34.73*** 32.92*** 5.40*** 3.79**
(0.10)
(21.11) (21.64) (2.50) (1.71)
1.10* (0.04)
1.00
1.03
1.05
1.09
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.06) (0.07)
1.04
1.23**
1.20*
1.11
1.06
(0.16)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.09) (0.10)
4.54***
0.74
0.39
(1.42)
(0.63)
(0.39)
0.53†
7.86***
0.57*
(0.19)
(4.49)
(0.16)
0.35**
0.61
0.24**
(0.12)
(0.51)
(0.12)

Terrorism only

Perpetrator non-white
Perpetrator white
Incident is also a hate
crime
Number killed
Incident is also a hate
crime * number killed
Perpetrator part of known
group
Perpetrator arrested
Target law
enforcement/government

Model
5
2.18†
(0.95)
0.48†
(0.21)
0.23**
(0.11)
1.01
(0.04)
1.13
(0.18)

Hate crime only

Multinomial logistic regression models. Constants not reported.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses and bolded if significant.
†
p < 0.10.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

Our next three hypotheses focus on how media depict attacks depending on whether
or not they also meet the criteria to be a hate crime. Hypothesis 3 expects that articles
will be less likely to reference terrorism only when the incident is also a hate crime,
which is supported. Across all cases (Models 5 and 6), the odds of an article referencing
terrorism only were 77–81% lower when the incident also met the criteria for a hate
crime. This finding was substantively the same in cases where there was no doubt they
were terrorism (Models 11 and 12). Hypothesis 4 expects that articles will be more likely
to reference hate crimes only when the incident is also a hate crime. Similarly, this
finding is supported in models with all cases (7 and 8) and with only those where there
is no doubt that they are terrorism (13 and 14). Hypothesis 5 expects that articles will be
more likely to reference both terrorism and hate crimes when the incident is also a hate
crime. As expected, the odds that an article mentions both terrorism and hate crimes is
about two and a half and five and a half times greater when the incident also meets the

criteria to be considered a hate crime—regardless of whether we are looking at the full
set of cases (Models 9 and 10) or only those where there is no doubt that they are also
terrorism (Models 15 and 16).
Table 4. Depicting attacks by article for cases where there is no doubt it is
terrorism. (Table view)
Terrorism &
hate crime
Model
Model Model Model
Model 12
13
14
15
16
2.47
0.24
0.04*
0.78
1.37
(1.52)
(0.25)
(0.06)
(0.93) (1.83)
0.65
0.42
0.10**
1.42
2.02
(0.39)
(0.35)
(0.08)
(1.60) (2.45)
0.22*
20.17*** 23.32*** 5.16** 3.88**
(0.14)
(12.42) (14.60) (2.65) (2.00)
1.08* (0.04)
1.02
1.11
1.03
1.09
(0.05)
(0.19)
(0.06) (0.07)
1.02
1.21*
1.12
1.10
1.04
(0.15)
(0.09)
(0.20)
(0.09) (0.08)
3.86***
1.91
0.32
(1.22)
(2.42)
(0.33)
0.45*
6.52**
0.53*
(0.14)
(3.63)
(0.13)
0.42*
0.60
0.25**
(0.15)
(0.64)
(0.13)

Terrorism only

Perpetrator non-white
Perpetrator white
Incident is also a hate
crime
Number killed
Incident is also a hate
crime * number killed
Perpetrator part of known
group
Perpetrator arrested
Target law
enforcement/government

Model
11
2.03
(1.00)
0.35*
(0.15)
0.30*
(0.15)
0.99
(0.05)
1.11
(0.16)

Hate crime only

Multinomial logistic regression models. Constants not reported.
Relative risk ratios are presented with clustered standard errors in parentheses and bolded if significant.
*
p < 0.05.
**
p < 0.01.
***
p < 0.001.

Our final two hypothesis focus on how the number of people killed influences how
media depict attacks. Hypothesis 6 expects that articles will be less likely to
reference terrorism only as the number of people killed increases and the incident is
also a hate crime. While the odds that an article references terrorism only increases
with more fatalities in the full models (8 and 12), the interaction between fatalities and
meeting the criteria to be considered a hate crime is not significant in any of the models
(7, 8, 11, or 12). Hypothesis 7 expects that articles will be more likely to
reference terrorism and hate crimes when the number of people killed increases and the
incident is also a hate crime, but this was not supported in any of the models (9, 10, 15,
or 16). Though, while we did not specify a hypothesis about this, in three models (7, 8,

and 13) the odds of referencing hate crimes only was higher when the incident met the
criteria to be considered a hate crime and more people were killed.
In the full models, we controlled for three factors that prior research show can
influence media coverage of terrorism: whether or not the perpetrator was part of a
group, whether or not the perpetrator was arrested, and whether or not the attack
targeted law enforcement or government. None of these three factors influence the
number of articles covering each case (Table 2) but they do influence what articles
mention (Tables 3 and 4). Unsurprisingly, when the perpetrator is associated with a
group the odds increase that articles covering the attack mention terrorism only. When
the perpetrator is arrested, the odds increase that articles covering the attack
mention hate crimes only and the odds decrease that articles covering the attack
mention both terrorism and hate crimes. Articles covering attacks that target law
enforcement or government are less likely to reference terrorism only or
both terrorism and hate crimes.
In sum, our results show that media do differentially cover terrorist attacks that are
also hate crimes compared to those that are not. From the newsworthiness perspective,
attacks that are also hate crimes receive significantly less media attention, which may
result in less public awareness that these occur. Additionally, attacks with higher
fatalities receive more coverage. Attacks with a non-white perpetrator receive the most
coverage, on average, followed by attacks with a white perpetrator and then attacks
with an unknown perpetrator. Turning to how media depict attacks in their coverage,
coverage of attacks that were also hate crimes was significantly more likely to reference
either hate crimes only or both terrorism and hate crimes and significantly less likely to
reference terrorism only. Further, coverage of attacks with non-white perpetrators were
more likely to be mention terrorism only and less likely to mention hate crimes only, but
only in some models and not in others. And, contrary to expectation, coverage of
attacks with white perpetrators was less likely to reference hate crimes only in some
models but not others. Finally, as more people are killed, the odds that an article
references terrorism only increases. And when more people are killed plus the attack
meet criteria for a hate crime as well, media are more likely to mention hate crimes only
in their coverage.

Discussion
Our motivating question for this paper was how—if at all—do media differentially cover
terrorist attacks that are also hate crimes compared to those that are not? To date,
research on media coverage of terrorism and media coverage of crime have largely
been separate. Further, only a few studies explicitly discuss the overlaps and
differences between terrorism and hate crimes. Here we bridge these literatures to

examine how media cover terrorist attack when they are also hate crimes versus when
they are not.
We do not have stated hypotheses for the newsworthiness portion of our models;
with the lack of research on the portrayal of hate crime in the media, there is no basis
for expectations. We find that attacks which are also hate crimes receive significantly
less media attention. This finding aligns with a number of earlier studies, each with a
corresponding mechanism. First and in line with prior research, we demonstrate that
incidents that are terrorism only receive more media coverage. 67 Second, as Gade and
colleagues found media coverage of white mass shooters to be more sympathetic and
positive, we show a similar relationship between hate crimes and media non-coverage,
a form of tacit approval. 68 While what is on the news is important, what is not on the
news also shapes the public perceptions and (lack of) awareness of issues in society.
We also find that each additional fatality is linked to a 34–37% increase in the
number of articles covering that attack. This suggests the adage, if it bleeds, it leads,
which supports prior research. 69 Again, what is not on the news also matters and, while
there is ample evidence that news media coverage of crime favors dominant values and
groups by over-covering minorities as perpetrators, 70 we demonstrate that minority
victims of hate crime are less likely to be covered in the media.
Both findings support the processes of social identity theory and the implications of
Black’s behavior of law. 71 The dominant societal viewpoint is likely to be reproduced
and reinforced by the media, including views of in- and out-groups. As hate crimes are
definitionally downward (or outward), the views of society, the media, and the
perpetrator are likely to align and the result is a lack of news coverage. Terrorism is
upward (or inward) and allows the media to represent attacks—particularly those with a
high body-count—as existential threats to societal values and interests.
Moving to how media depict attacks, our first two stated hypotheses dealt with the
race of the perpetrator; we expected a positive correlation between media coverage
mentioning terrorism and a non-white perpetrator, plus between media coverage
mentioning hate crimes and a white perpetrator. The terrorism/non-white connection is
partially supported, but the hate crimes/white connection was not. In fact, the most
significant finding here is that media coverage is more likely to reference hate crimes for
attacks with an unknown perpetrator compared to attacks either committed by a known
white or known non-white perpetrator. Given the earlier discussion on the difficulty of
proving bias in hate crime cases, and the police hesitancy to categorize non-obvious
bias crimes as hate crimes as a result, we may be witnessing an opposite effect: in the
absence of evidence of non-bias, the media is free to speculate (and possibly appeal to
more viewers).
Our next three stated hypotheses test how the media depict attacks as hate
crime or terrorism. While there remains difficulty in convicting offenders of hate crime

enhancements, media are not held to such stringent standards. In our analysis of H2,
we found that the media is reluctant to classify attacks by known attackers as hate
crimes, but our analysis of H3 through H5 shows that when media do label an attack as
a hate crime, it is more often than not correct in their assessment. The found differences
could be an indication of accuracy in reporting or of something more complex. It is
beyond the scope of this study, but future work should analyze the content of the
coverage for evidence of in- and out-group reinforcement. Just as prior research on
hate crimes found, it is possible to be both accurate while also bolstering dominant
viewpoints and affecting perceptions of group-based differences. 72
The final two hypotheses concern how media depict attacks in relation to number of
people killed. As more people are killed, articles are more likely to
mention terrorism only, while as more people are killed and the attack meets the criteria
for a hate crime, the more likely to mention hate crimes only. These final two findings
we find most illuminating and worthy of further study; our evidence suggests more
conceptual distance than closeness. While there is considerable overlap in the standard
definitions of terrorism and hate crime, our findings suggest there is more to the
difference than just degree of violence. Thus, hate crime on a large scale is not
necessarily terrorism and terrorism on a small scale is not necessarily hate crime.
Conceptually, this makes sense: the motivational sources and end goals of terrorism
and hate crimes typically differ, even if the means are similar. This does suggest that,
though the media may inject varying levels of bias 73 and dominant dogma 74 into its
reporting, there remains an appreciable difference between the two that is impossible to
entirely obscure.
Our analysis of control variables also yields some suggested support for these
intrinsic differences. We found that articles were more likely to mention terrorism only
when the perpetrator is associated with a group and that articles were more likely to
mention hate crimes only when the perpetrator was arrested. The motivational source
for an attack is difficult to ascertain, unless explicitly stated; in both of the
aforementioned cases, the media is typically provided with additional information about
the attack leading to both an increase in accuracy of reporting and a differentiation
between the types of attack. Additionally, while a past study has shown attacks receive
more coverage when the target is law enforcement or government, 75 we found that the
media depict these attacks as terrorism only less often.
Returning to what little we know about the media and hate crime coverage, 76 our
research suggests not only that terrorism and hate crimes are differentially covered, but
that dominant viewpoints are broadcast and minority ones are silenced. Part of this
might be explained by body count, as we found increased deaths lead to increased
coverage, and terror attacks typically claim more victims than hate crimes, but the
crime direction and relational distance also seem to matter. Black did not cover the

media, only public perception, yet the patterns we uncovered echo his arguments: “The
offense of a marginal person or group against an integrated person or group is more
serious than an offense in the opposite direction” 77 and “Deviant behavior by a marginal
person or group against an integrated person or group, or centripetal deviance, is the
most serious.” 78

Conclusion
Limitations and Future Direction
As we see from this paper, media do differentially cover terrorist attacks that are also
hate crimes compared to those that are not. Of course, our findings are not without
limitation and room for expansion. First, as noted in the methods section, ideally, we
would have also examined media coverage of attacks that meet the criteria for hate
crimes, but not for terrorism. While the GTD systematically codes terrorist attacks
without reliance on law enforcement reporting, no similar database exists for hate
crimes. Rather, the FBI’s Unified Crime Report data relies on reporting from local law
enforcement which is often incomplete, likely missing for non-random reasons, and
often does not include sufficient information to search news coverage. Thus, it is
impossible to create a comparable list of all hate crimes in the U.S. over this time period
and pull media coverage of them. Any attempt at this would likely be biased in ways that
would render findings invalid, which is unfortunately an unavoidable limitation. Second,
our project is limited to print media coverage of attacks which—particularly in the digital
age—is not constrained by the amount of airtime in a day. It is possible that examining
trends in broadcast news media coverage would yield different results or exacerbate
present findings. While examining this is beyond the scope of the current project, it is a
worthy avenue for future study to expand research on media coverage of crime and
terrorism. Third, we focus only on U.S. based attacks and news coverage. Thus, the
question remains on the extent to which our findings would generalize to other
questions, which also present an opportunity for further exploration. Fourth, our data
range from 2006 through 2015 and, since 2016, the world has seen shifts in political
discourse, the parties in power, and a spike in bias crimes. The Uniform Crime Report
has noted hate crimes have increased for the third consecutive year, beginning in
2016. 79
Future work should include cases from 2016 onward, look at media beyond print,
and go deeper into newsworthiness and bias in media coverage. We have shown that
the media treats the two crime types differentially, but have only begun to explain how
or why. Studies of media discourse around homosexuality and moral panics, 80 for
example, find that moral entrepreneurs manipulate the media for political, societal, and

cultural ends. Only by doing a deeper textual analysis would it be possible to draw
similar conclusions about hate crime alone or in relation to terrorism.
Beyond media coverage, our work suggests a real difference between the two attack
types other than academic (upward/downward and inward/outward).
While terrorism may simply “sell” better than hate crime to a media audience, we return
to our finding that even high fatality hate crimes receive less coverage than high fatality
terrorist attacks. A theoretical study should consider these differences in
how terrorism and hate crimes are conceptualized and where there is conceptual
overlap or distinction in addition to the purely quantitative and commonly explored, such
as scope.
Implications
Our research has implications for the theoretical debate between terrorism and hate
crimes being “close cousins” or “distant relatives.” 81 The newsworthiness portion of our
study demonstrated a difference in the media attention an attack receives,
with terrorism receiving more attention than hate crimes. When considering media
depictions of high-body count attacks, we note both accuracy in reporting and media
support for the dominant narrative. This points to inherent differences between the
crimes beyond scale that are worthy of more theoretical attention and examination of
how the public perceives acts of violence.
We only found partial support for the hypothesis that non-white perpetrators
of terrorism of receive more media coverage, but we also found that non-white
perpetrators of hate crime receive more media coverage, not white perpetrators as
originally hypothesized. We went into this study with a few general assumptions,
including “if it bleeds, it leads” and that dominant narratives (“minorities commit
terrorism” and “majorities commit hate crimes”) would determine media depictions.
Instead, we find partial support that the media covers minorities more when they commit
terrorism and when they commit hate crimes. Likewise, we find full support for the
argument that cases with minority victims (hate crimes) receive less media attention and
that low fatality count attacks (again, more typical of hate crimes) receive less media
attention, too.
Black’s relational distance provides one explanation for this. 82 Inward crimes
(terrorism) appear more threatening to the general public because most people consider
themselves to be at the center of society. Outward crimes (hate crimes) by definition are
less relatable to the general public. Beyond this, we can imagine crimes not of center
versus periphery (or vice versa), but periphery versus periphery. For example, an Amish
on Amish attack. We expect attacks like this to receive the least amount of media
attention overall.
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